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Abstract. The problem that arises is how the State official in a monopoly situation 
maximizes the value of bribes collected, by selling public services to users? To answer this 
question, we show that the State agent in a monopoly situation can discriminate users 
according to their characteristics in order to collect more possible bribes. The Shleifer and 
Vishny’ simple monopoly model is therefore limited. The survey of patients of nine public 
hospitals in Douala revealed the existence of two forms of corruption at consultation: 
corruption without theft and corruption with theft. An evaluation of maximizing the 
earnings of medical doctors using odds ratios, showed that in the pursuit of these gains and 
whatever the form of corruption practiced, the State agent plays not only on amounts of 
bribes paid, but also on users’ characteristics. However, for amounts between 3,000 FCFA 
and 5,000 FCFA, our results revealed that the doctor will tend to practice the form of 
corruption without theft on men, the wealthiest, the learned and the old where he/she would 
draw the greatest possible gain.  
Keywords. Corruption with and without theft, Discrimination at first degree, Health system, 
Odds ratios, Cameroon. 
JEL. D40, I10, I14, I15. 
 
1. Introduction 
n an economy, social services are often characterized by markets’ failure. To 
correct these failures, the State intervenes through the provision, the financing 
and the regulation of these services. It is well known that corruption emerges as 
a by-product of the State’s intervention (Acemuglu & Verdier, 2000). However, 
what remains less understood is the impact of the phenomenon on these public 
services. 
The theoretical literature identifies three channels through which corruption 
negatively affects the provision of public services by the State. First of all, 
corruption can increase prices and decrease the amount of goods and services 
offered by the State (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Secondly, corruption can reduce 
investment in human capital (Ehrlich & Lui, 1999). Finally, it can reduce the 
State’s revenues (Hindriks, Keen & Muthoo, 1999), which in turn can decrease the 
quality of public services offered (Bearse, Glomm & Janaba 2000). The poor 
quality of services discourages some individuals to use them, and reduce their 
willingness to payment (through tax evasion). Consequently, the tax basis 
decreases, as well as the ability of the State to provide quality public services 
(Alesina, 1999). The poor quality of public services also creates incentives that 
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lead individuals to opt for services offered by the private sector. However, in 
countries where private markets for health and education services are limited, this 
situation can lead to congestion, increasing delays in obtaining public services, 
increasing the rent-seeking opportunities and a frequent use of the discretionary 
power by civil servants. Even in the case where private markets are well developed 
and extensive, the poor may lack the ability to pay for services and private goods 
(Gupta, Davoodi & Tiongson, 1998). 
In particular for Shleifer & Vishny (1993), the State official in a simple 
monopoly situation maximizes his/her collection of bribes. With this situation, 
he/she may determine the amount of services to be provided, either by multiplying 
the appointments to users, or by simply refusing to serve them. This maximization 
is done in two ways: In the first case, the user pays the bribe plus the official price; 
this is corruption without theft, and in the second case, he/she only pays the bribe; 
this is corruption with theft. What this model does not explicitly shows us is that in 
some cases (public hospitals), the State agent in a monopoly situation can 
discriminate users in order to collect more possible bribes. 
Empirically, Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson applied in 1998, the model of 
Shleifer & Vishny (1993) for 62 countries, using corruption indices of the World 
Bank (World Development Report, 1997), that of CIET International and PRS / 
ICRG (Political Risk Services / International Country Guide). This study is 
instructive because it reveals that corruption negatively affects the provision’s 
indicators as far as health and education are concerned. But it also has some 
limitations. First of all, as the authors themselves point out, these indices are not 
always reliable, because they do not necessarily capture the corrupt practices that 
take place between minor civil servants and ordinary citizens who daily ask for 
services in hospitals and public schools. Therefore, it does not identify the various 
forms of corruption prevailing in public services of these countries. In contrast, 
Yamb & Bayemi (2017) studied the forms of corruption in the provision of health 
care in Douala metropolis public hospitals of Cameroon, based on a survey of users 
of these hospitals. The importance of this study highlights two forms of corruption, 
namely corruption without theft and corruption with theft. However, this study is 
somewhat limited insofar as it does not take into account the fact that the State 
agent can discriminate patients according to their characteristics and the amount of 
the bribe paid. 
Thus, the purpose of this study is to fill these gaps by showing that the State 
agent in a monopoly situation can discriminate patients in order to collect more 
possible bribes; secondly, the discrimination made by medical doctors can be 
illustrated through a survey of patients in nine public hospitals of the city of 
Douala, the Cameroon's economic capital. In particular, we will test for different 
amounts of bribes set, the relationship between corruption without theft and the 
income level on the one hand, and corruption with theft and the income level on the 
other. In each of these cases, we will seek to ascertain, as suggested by the 
theoretical models (Kaufman & Wei, 1999; Lui, 1985), whether health workers 
discriminate their patients based on their ability to pay. Such an argument implies 
that the wealthiest should be those to whom bribes are asked the most. 
The importance of this study is twofold. First of all, it helps to show that the 
simple monopoly used by Shleifer & Vishny (1993) underestimates not only the 
value of bribes likely to be collected, but also the loss of income that corrupt 
practices cause to public services. Secondly, since the users’ discrimination 
mechanism is at the origin of corrupt practices, this study leads us to better 
understand these practices.  
The evaluation of the phenomenon reveals that the State agent, regardless of the 
form of corruption practiced, maximizes his/her earnings by playing not only on 
the characteristics of individuals, but also on the levels of bribe amounts. The rest 
of the study is organized around the following points: we secondly present the 
methodological aspects of the model evaluation while highlighting the estimation 
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methodology. Results are presented and discussed later before concluding the 
study. 
 
2. The Methodological aspects of the model evaluation 
The empirical evaluation of the model involves the construction of a triple entry 
contingency table that shows not only the different forms of corruption, but also the 
characteristics of the users and the different amounts of bribes paid. Thus, to 
highlight the users’ characteristics victims of corruption with and without theft at 
consultation, we have preceded by an estimate through odds ratios while 
identifying the different amounts of bribe paid by users. The age, income, 
educational level and gender variables were selected for the occasion. The estimate 
by odds ratios were apprehended through the construction of triple entry 
contingency tables of the form 2x 2 x2 below for each characteristic studied:  
 
Table 1. Contingency table of size 2x2x2 
Amounts fixed for bribes 
paid (control variable) 
Users’ characteristics 
(Independent variable) 
Corruption with or without theft 
(dependent variable) 
No Yes 
Less than 1,000FCFA Cj 
Cj 
N11 
N21 
N12  
N12 
[1,000 ; 3,000[ Cj 
Cj 
N11 
N21 
N12 
N22 
[3,000 ; 5,000[ Cj 
Cj 
N11 
N21 
N12 
N22 
[5,000 ; 7,000[ Cj 
Cj 
N11 
N21 
N12 
N22 
Sources: Authors’Conception 
 
N12 and N11 represent the number of people of modality1 (C1) of characteristic C 
victims or not of a particular type of corruption, given an amount of bribe paid. The 
same interpretation can be made for modality2 (C2) for the numbers N22 and 
N21.These different joint distributions Nij were used to calculate the following 
conditional (partial): odds ratios:  
 
 
 
The different contingency tables of 2x2 dimension obtained when the amounts 
of bribe paid are fixed contains each, the above identified characteristics, and are 
divided into two modalities and the type of corruption that the user is being victim 
of (with or without theft).The estimates of the relationship between each type 
of corruption and the users’ characteristics, given the amount of bribe paid, are 
shown in Tables 6 and 7 below, together with their respective confidence intervals. 
When
/ 1iij c  , the first modality of characteristic C is more likely to be victim of a 
particular type of corruption than the second, and 
/ 1iij c  implies the opposite. 
 
3. Hospitals’ functioning and corrupt pratices1 
As generally in Cameroon, the health sector in Douala is made up of private and 
public hospitals. If we stick to the latter category to which the present study is 
based, we essentially distinguish the reference hospitals and the district hospitals 
which operate under the Ministry of Health. The first two are: the Laquintinie and 
the General Hospitals and the latter seven are: the Deido, Bonassama, 
Bonamoussadi, Cité des Palmiers, New-bell, Nylon and Logbaba hospitals. The 
district hospitals are dedicated in particular to ensure first a better quality of care by 
 
1 Yamb & Bayemi (2017). 
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
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a motivated and disciplined staff, and for which the patient becomes the only 
concern. Then, these hospitals must ensure a better decentralized management of 
costs recovery on medical procedures, medications and prepayments set up for a 
progressive empowerment. And, finally, they must support emergency and sick 
internees. Reference Hospitals are above district hospitals. These are technical high 
level structures which in relation to specialized care provide reference and anti-
reference, welcome patients from district hospitals. To ensure the reference, these 
two hospitals are equipped with specialized doctors and special medical 
equipments absent in district hospitals. However, the status of the Laquintinie 
hospital is a little bit different from that of the General hospital. Empowered with a 
legal personality and a financial autonomy, the General hospital is more 
independent of the Ministry of Health than the Laquintinie hospital. The first 
recruits its own doctors and pay them higher wages than those earned by doctors at 
the Laquintinie hospital and others. They are paid by the Ministry of Finance. In 
early 1990s, Cameroonian civil servants’ salaries have declined by more than 50% 
as part of the structural adjustment programs enacted by the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Certainly, in the meantime, they have recorded some wage increases. 
But these have failed to regain their former standard of living, pushing them to 
collect wrongly or rightly non-statutory fees from users. This collection is favored 
by the almost non-existence of health insurance system, and the fact that each user 
is required to officially pay cash, the  services for which he/she wants to access. 
Thus, following ECAM32, nearly 85% of households’ heads living in urban and 
semi-urban areas feel that the level of corruption in the health sector is high in this 
country. But the magnitude of the phenomenon varies from one region to another 
(69.8% to 61.1% in Douala and Yaoundé). For example, during consultation, 
corruption occurs mainly through the payment of non-regulatory fees and through 
the interventions of personalities to be quickly served and avoid waiting for a long 
time (INS, 2011, P. 84). We do not take this last aspect into account in this study. 
Patients in public hospitals also complain of the unavailability of medical doctors. 
This unavailability can be explained by the fact that private health facilities that 
accompany the government in the offer of health services to populations mostly 
have as promoters, medical doctors working in the public sector. Many patients 
who visit public health facilities are oriented by these doctors to their private health 
centers for their medical care. Thus, being interviewed on their perception of the 
level of corruption in the health sector as parts of the households’ survey in 2007, 
almost six out of ten households in the city of Douala believe it is high. This 
reflects a general malaise. As a matter of fact, if access to basic social services 
including health is a constant concern for public authorities, corruption in the 
health sector is like a gangrene which tends to negate the efforts made by the State 
(INS, 2011). 
 
4. Results and discussion  
4.1. Determination and characteristics of the sample’s size3 
As we were unable to determine an approximate P value through a prior survey 
(because to our knowledge, no investigation about corruption in public hospitals 
has yet been carried out in Cameroon), that is to say, the proportion of respondents 
in the context of a preliminary study, we set P to 0.5, this value representing the 
worst case, that is to say, the value which gives the greatest possible standard 
deviation for the sampling distribution of P  . In this case, the required sample size 
to ensure an error margin E (in absolute value) not exceeding 5% with a confidence 
level of 95% will be about (Baillargeon, 1989):  
 
 
2Survey of households by the Cameroon National Institute of Statistics (INS, 2007). 
3The determination of the sample’s size and its characteristics is inspired by the article Yamb, & 
Bayemi, (2015). 
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With: E: the error margin, Z: the standard normal distribution,  : The 
estimator of P in the preliminary study. The distribution of the number of 
individuals to be interviewed is done from the number of medical and paramedical 
staff in each hospital selected as shown in the table below: 
 
Table 2. The distribution of the number of patients to be interviewed by hospital 
Hospital 
Staff 
Number 
Importance of the 
hospital (in %) 
Number of patients to be  
interviewed 
Laquintinie 630 41 157 
General  326 21 81 
New-Bell 113 7 27 
Bonassama 103 7 25 
Cité Palmiers 100 6 25 
Deido 84 5 21 
Logbaba 80 5 20 
Nylon 62 4 15 
Bonamoussadi 57 4 14 
Total 1 555 100 384 
Source: Our estimates based on information collected at the Regional Health Delegation 
                
The first column describes the type of hospital, the second column the total 
number of medical and paramedical staff, the third indicates the weight or 
importance of the personnel of each hospital as compared to the staff of all the 
hospitals in general, and the last column, the approximate number of people who 
should be interviewed by hospital, based on the weight of each hospital. We came 
up with a total of 384 interviewees. For prudence sake, we distributed 415 
questionnaires with the assumption that all incorrectly completed questionnaires 
would be eliminated, this to help approximately achieve the sample’s size. Thus, 
407 questionnaires were filled out correctly and therefore validated. It is on the 
basis of these 407 questionnaires that the analysis was performed. 
The table below specifies the characteristics of the patients’ sample: age, school 
level (education), income, marital and employment status: 
Regarding the age characteristic, it has been split into two categories: young 
people between 20 and 40 years old and the old over forty years old. This 
nomenclature at the age level reflects the country's socio-economic situation as 
concerns employment insofar as five years ago, authorities launched recruitment 
campaign in the public sector for the youth (25,000 in total), thus considering as 
young any person aged forty and less. The income characteristic also obeys to this 
dualistic nomenclature, that is, those with an income of 250, 000 CFA Francs and 
less, and those who earn more than 250,000 CFA Francs. This classification took 
into account the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. This choice is 
justified by the fact that initially, we considered four classes of income namely less 
than75,000, between75,000 and 150,000, from 150, 000 to 250,000 and the class of 
more than 250,000. It is worth mentioning that among the 407 respondents, almost 
83% have an income of 250,000 and less, and only about17% earn more than 
250,000.This latter percentage represents the senior staffs in companies and 
businessmen/contractors, who are considered in the Cameroonian environment as 
people belonging to the richest social class. 80% of the first mentioned earn more 
than 250,000 CFA Francs, and nearly 50% of the second category as much, hence 
the justification for the classification in terms of income distribution in the two 
categories, that is, 250,000 and under, and above 250,000. This is also applied to 
the education variable where two categories were retained: higher level and no 
higher level. 
 
 
 
P
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Table 3. The characteristics of users’ sample 
 Male Female Total % Male % Female Total % 
Age       
 40 years old and Less 134 190 324 41,4 58,6 100 
More than 40 years old 52 31 83 62,7 37,3 100 
Education       
Primary and secondary Education 97 145 242 40,1 59,2 100 
Higher Education 89 76 165 53,9 46,1 100 
Average montly Income       
Less than 75, 000  CFA Francs 78 106 184 42,4 57,6 100 
Between 75,000 and  150, 000 48 52 100 48 52 100 
Between 150,000 and 250, 000 26 28 54 48 52 100 
More than 250,000 35 34 69 50,7 49,3 100 
Matrimonial Status       
Maried 72 99 171 42,1 57,9 100 
Single  74 82 156 47,4 52,6 100 
Divorced 10 9 19 52,6 47,4 100 
Other  30 31 61 49,2 50,8 100 
Socio-professionnal Category       
Senior staff  17 7 24 70,8 29,2 100 
Control Agent  21 14 35 60 40 100 
Enforcement to officer 22 15 37 59,5 40,5 100 
Contractor (Business man) 25 4 29 86,2 13,8 100 
House Wives  55 55  100 100 
Trader  25 42 67 37,3 62,7 100 
Unemployed 30 29 59 50,8 49,2 100 
Others (informal) 46 55 101 45,5 54,5 100 
Total  186 221 407 45,7 54,3 100 
Source: Our Surveys’ results 
 
We also identified for all hospitals in general some measures of position 
(percentiles and mode), useful in determining the characteristics of those who pay 
amounts of bribe. We use the table below to determine these measures:  
 
Table 4. Amount of bribes paid (in CFA Francs) per scale 
Amount of bribes Classes Number Percentage 
0   to 1,000 1 122 30.0 
1,000 to 3,000 2 128 31.4 
3,000 to 5,000 3 102 25.1 
5,000 to 7,000 4 55 13.51 
Total   407 100.0 
Source: Results obtained from the survey data  
 
This table shows the proportion of users’ who pay bribes depending on 
amounts. It shows that the amounts mostly paid are in class 1 and 2 (below 1,000 
and between 1,000 and 3,000). Class 4 meanwhile shows the proportion of the least 
bribe paid. From the above table, the following statistics were obtained: 
 
Table 5. Some descriptive statistics on amounts of bribe paid (in CFA Francs)  
Characteristics Values Rounded Values 
Mean 2442 2500 
Skewness Coefficient 0.335 0.335 
Kurtosis coefficient -0.986 -0.986 
Mode 1936.29 2000 
Percentiles 25 834 1000 
50 2300 2500 
75 3083.33 3000 
Source: Results obtained from the survey data 
 
This table shows the calculated real values and the rounded values. To simplify 
the presentation, we have rather considered the last, insofar as they more reflect the 
reality of the amounts of bribe paid which are usually whole numbers (round), not 
followed by pennies. Considering for example the average bribe, we have put it to 
2,500 instead of 2,442. (In fact, it will be easier in practice for a patient to pay an 
amount of 2,500 instead of 2,442). The same thing goes with the median bribe 
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(2,500 instead of 2,300) and the mode (2,000 instead of 1936.29) and it is noticed 
that the mean (2,442), the median (2,300) and the mode (1939.29) are in the same 
class as the modal class. It therefore appears that 2,000 would be nearly the amount 
of bribe paid, and with a positive asymmetry (Skewness) coefficient (0.335), we 
came to the conclusion that the majority of bribes paid tend to larger amounts as 
compared to the average of bribes.  
 
4.2. Amounts of bribe paid during consultation 
As concerns corruption in consultation, the nurse who is the medical doctor’s 
secretary takes the health parameters of each patient and writes them in the medical 
book which costs 1,000 CFA francs in each public hospital except the General 
Hospital. The purchase of this book by the patient gives him/her the right to 
consultation. On the contrary, at the General Hospital, consultation is 7,000 CFA 
francs. In both cases, the Secretary is in charge in an orderly manner, of asking 
patients to enter the consultation room where the medical doctor is. The normal 
approach is that the "first come must be consulted first." Unfortunately, in reality, 
this principle is flouted. The patient who puts bribe in his/her medical book is the 
first to be served. This is what Shleifer & Vishny (1993) called corruption without 
theft, since the consultation price is equal to the official price plus the bribe. This 
benefits to the doctor and his/her secretary at the detriment of patients. Some 
patients will be squeezed out of the public hospital because of rising prices. 
However, the investigation revealed that the “gombo”4 varies from one hospital to 
another, as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 6. Average amounts of bribe paid during consultation        
List of Hospitals 
Official amounts 
for consultation 
Average amount of bribe 
paid during consultation in 
CFA Francs 
Actual total amount for 
a consultation 
General Hospital 7 000 1494 8 494 
Laquintinie Hospital 1 000 3411 4 411 
Logbaba Hospital 1 000 2095 3 095 
Deido Hospital 1 000 1714 2 714 
Bonamoussadi Hospital 1 000 1714 2 714 
Bonassama Hospital 1 000 1636 2 636 
Cité des palmiers 1 000 2462 3 462 
Nylon Hospital 1 000 375 1 375 
New-Bell Hospital 1 000 1500 2 500 
General Average of bribe 1 665 2433 3 489 
Source: Results obtained from the surveys’ data. 
  
By taking into account the official price, this last table shows that the cost of 
consultation is equal to the official price plus 3,411 FCFA at the Laquintinie 
hospital or more of 2,095 FCFA at the Logbaba hospital. In general in each of the 
hospitals, corruption makes more expensive the cost of consulting a sick as 
compare to the official price as shown in the diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Term most often used to illustrate bribe 
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Figure 1. The official price and the average bribe during consultation 
Source: Our surveys 
 
It appears that the average bribe is more expensive than the official cost of 
consultation in all hospitals (except at the General and Nylon Hospitals). On 
average, the price of consultation is equal to the official price plus 2,433FCFA. 
According to Shleifer & Vishny (1993), corruption is more easily practiced when 
the head of medical care supply is in a monopoly situation. In this case, he/she 
determines both the quantity and the price of the good or service. The discretionary 
power held by the doctor allows him/her to reduce the quantity of service rendered, 
either by refusing to honor the appointment given to patients, or by simply refusing 
to serve them or even by discriminating them (and this is the most frequent case). 
 
4.3. Characteristics of victims through discrimination 
Two types of questions to be answered by no or yes were asked to users to 
illustrate corruption with and without theft namely: to be consulted, the patient 
only pays the bribe (corruption with theft)for the first case, and for the second case, 
the patient who wants to be consulted must pay the official fees plus the 
bribe(corruption without theft). The question that arises is therefore to know the 
type of corruption that would most maximize the doctor’s gains for different 
characteristics of users, given the amount of bribe paid (conditional or partial 
aspect of the phenomenon). The results of estimates through odds ratios presented 
in the tables below allowed us to have an idea of the phenomenon’s magnitude, by 
a simple comparison of the coefficients of both forms of corruption. 
 
Table 7. Corruption with theft 
AMOUNTS  Gender Income School level Age 
/
ˆ
S H  
Confidence 
Interval at 
95% of
/
ˆ
S H  
/
ˆ
R H  
Confidence   
Interval at 
95% of
/
ˆ
R H  
/
ˆ
NS H  
Confidence   
Interval at 
95% of 
/
ˆ
NS H  
/
ˆ
A H  
Confidence   
Interval at 
95% of 
/
ˆ
A H  
< 1,000 0.66  (0.26 ; 1.62)  0.33 (0.07 ; 1.53) 0.90 (0.36 ; 2.27) 1.02 (0.34 : 3.08) 
[1,000 ; 3,000[ 0.47 (0.20 ; 1.09) 0.66 (0.17 ;2.49) 1.20 ( 0.52; 2.76) 1.38 (0.48 ; 3.95) 
[3,000 ; 5,000[ 0.95 (0.40 ;2.27) 0.58 (0.17 ; 1.93) 0.88 (0.37 ; 2.09) 0.48 (0.16 ; 1.43) 
[5,000 ; 7,000[ 1.89 (0.54 ; 6.61) 0.97 (0.17; 5.48) 0.70 (0.20 ;2.49) 0.20 (0.02 ;1.79) 
Estimate with 
amounts not 
taken into 
account 
ˆ
S
=0.76 
 
(0.48 ; 1.21) ˆ
R = 
0.56 
 
(0.28 ; 1.13) ˆNS = 
0.95 
 
(0.59 ; 1.51) ˆ
A
=0.74 
 
(0.41 ; 1.33) 
Source: Results obtained from the survey data 
 
 
 
 
 
0
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Table 8. Corruption without theft 
AMOUNTS  Gender Income School level Age 
/
ˆ
S H  
Confidence 
Interval at 
95% of 95% 
de /
ˆ
S H  
/
ˆ
R H  
Confidence 
Interval at 
95% of
/
ˆ
R H  
/
ˆ
NS H  
Confidence 
Interval at 
95% of
/
ˆ
NS H  
/
ˆ
A H  
Confidence 
Interval at 
95% of 
/
ˆ
A H  
< 1,000 0.66  (0.31 ; 1.40)  0.73 (0.27 ; 1.94) 0.51 (0.23 ; 1.13) 1.52 (0.62 : 3.72) 
[1,000 ; 
3,000[ 
1.13 (0.49 ; 2.60) 2.41 (0.51 ;11.22) 0.92 ( 0.39; 2.13) 1.92 (0.52 ; 7.06) 
[3,000 ; 
5,000[ 
0.91 (0.30 ; 2.75) 4.53 (0.56 ; 36.44) 1.25 (0.42 ; 3.77) 2.70 (0.57 ; 12.82) 
[5,000 ; 
7,000[ 
1.80 (0.44 ;7.28) 0.51 (0.08; 3.12) 0.47 (0.12 ;1.81) 1.02 (0.18 ;5.70) 
Estimate  
with 
amounts not 
taken into 
account 
ˆ
S =0.93 
 
(0.59 ; 1.48) ˆ
R = 1.26 
 
(0.65 ; 2.41) ˆNS = 
0.72 
 
(0.45 ; 1.15) ˆ
A =1.71 
 
(0.92 ; 3.17) 
Source: Results obtained from the survey data 
 
For amounts of bribe paid less than 1,000 FCFA, we find for the gender that the 
men are most prone to the phenomenon with a rating of about 51% (1 / 0.66 = 
1.51) higher than that of women. Thus, the State agent, whatever the form of 
corruption practiced, maximizes his/her gains over men to the same extent. 
As far as the income characteristic is concerned, our estimates show for both 
forms of corruption, that the least fortunate are the most victims. However, the 
magnitude being more pronounced for victims of corruption with theft than for 
victims without theft. The medical doctor maximizes his/her gains over the least 
fortunate by practicing corruption with theft. It is the same thing for the education 
characteristic, where the least educated would be more victims with a higher scope 
for corruption without theft (a rating of 96% compared to 11% for the form with 
theft). The public official takes over his/her gains on the least educated, by 
practicing the form of corruption without theft. Finally as concerns age, we find 
that whatever the form of corruption considered, the old are most victims. The 
State official would maximize his/her gains much on the old by practicing 
corruption without theft (odd of 52% against 2% for the form with theft).  
For bribe amounts between 1,000 and 3,000, the results show that for gender, it 
is on men that the medical doctor maximizes much his/her gains by practicing the 
form of corruption with theft. On the contrary for the income characteristic, he/she 
would have interest to practice the form without theft on the wealthiest for whom 
the odds of maximizing his/her profits would be approximately 2.41 times higher. 
If the form with theft was practiced in this case on the least fortunate, his/her 
chances are rather most likely to the form with theft, and the least educated for a 
corruption without theft. The doctor then pulls more gains by practicing corruption 
with theft on the most educated on whom his/her chances of maximizing are 20% 
higher. The same thing goes with age where he/she would have nearly 92% more 
likely to maximize his/her gains on the old when practicing the form of corruption 
without theft. 
For amounts between 3,000 and 5,000, our estimates show that the public 
official has interest in practicing the form without theft whatever the characteristic, 
compared to the coefficients obtained for the form with theft: thus, he/she would 
take much gain from men, the wealthier, the most educated and the old. 
Finally, for amounts between 5,000 and 7,000, the agent would be interested in 
practicing the form with theft on women on whom his/her chances of maximizing 
would be 89% higher. However, he/she takes more gains rather by practicing the 
form without theft on the wealthiest on whom his/her chances of maximizing 
would be about 96% higher. This is also applied to the most educated on whom 
he/she would be about 2.12 times more likely. Finally, our estimates reveal at the 
age level that the State officer draws much his/her gains on the youth by practicing 
a form of corruption with theft on whom his/her chances of maximizing would be 5 
times greater.   
We can also get an idea of the evolution of the phenomenon when we do not 
take into account the different bribe amounts paid (marginal aspect of the 
phenomenon): In this case, we just assume the relationship between the 
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characteristics and the form of corruption practiced. By always proceeding through 
comparison, we note that at the gender level, the men are most likely, whatever the 
form of corruption, but however, with a higher scope for the form with theft. On 
the contrary with income, gains are much drawn from the side of the less fortunate 
for a form of corruption with theft, with maximizing odds for about 78% greater. 
As concerns the education characteristic, we notice as for the gender, that the State 
agent pulls more gains from the least educated,  this whatever the form of 
corruption practiced, but with greater magnitude with the form without theft. 
Finally, the age characteristic reveals that by practicing a form without theft, the 
older people are the most victims.  
 The table below summarizes the discussion developed above. In fact, it reveals 
that to maximize his/her gains5, the medical doctor takes into account not only the 
form of corruption, but also the users’ characteristics and the levels of bribes’ 
amounts. Thus, for bribes paid below 1,000FCFA, the doctor maximizes his/her 
gains on men and the less fortunate in the case of the form of corruption with theft, 
and in the case of the form without theft on the men, the least educated and the old. 
Similarly for bribes paid between 1,000 and 3,000, earnings will be maximized on 
men’s characteristics and that of the most educated for a form of corruption with 
theft, and for the form without theft, on the wealthiest, the least educated and the 
old. We find that the public official has no interest in applying the form with theft 
for amounts of bribes paid between 3,000 and 5,000. It is rather on the form 
without theft that he/she has most income, especially from the men, the wealthiest, 
the most educated and the old. Finally, for bribes paid between 5,000 and 7,000, a 
form of corruption with theft are practiced on women and the youth for a 
maximization of gains on one hand, and on the wealthiest and the most educated 
for the form without theft the other. 
 
Table 9. Characteristics to consider in the maximization of gains by the agent with regard to 
the corruption form 
amount of bribe  Gender Income Education Age 
< 1,000 
Corruption with theft  
Men The least fortunate   
Corruption without theft  
Men  The least educated The Old 
[1,000-3,000[ 
Corruption with theft  
Men   The most educated  
Corruption without theft  
 The wealthiest The least educated The Old 
[3,000-5,000[ 
Corruption with theft  
    
Corruption without theft  
Men  The wealthiest The most educated The Old 
[5,000-7,000[ 
Corruption with theft  
Women   The Younger 
Corruption without theft  
 The wealthiest The most educated  
Source: Results obtained from the survey data 
 
5. Conclusion  
The aim of this study was to highlight the maximization of bribes collected by 
the State agent from patients in public hospitals in the city of Douala, Cameroon, 
taking into account the characteristics of the users as well as the different amounts 
of bribes paid. The results obtained on users of nine public hospitals in the city of 
Douala reveals that unlike the simple monopoly used by Shleifer & Vishny (1993) 
and whatever the form of corruption practiced (with or without theft), the State 
agent plays on the individuals’ characteristics (discrimination at the first degree) 
and the levels of bribes’ amounts paid to maximize his/her gains. For instance, for 
 
5We are talking about maximizing gains rather than profit because in this case, we are noting 
possession of the cost function of the medical doctor providing the service. 
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bribe payments between 1,000 and 3,000, the results indicate that the gains will be 
maximized on men, the most educated for the form of corruption with theft on one 
hand, and on the wealthiest, the least educated and the old for the form without 
theft on the other. However, for amounts of bribes paid between 3,000 and 5,000, 
our results show that the State agent would be interested in practicing only the form 
without theft for all the characteristics which he/she would draw the greatest 
possible gain. In maximizing gains, the study does not take into account the costs 
borne by the State agent when he/she sells public services, hence maximizing gains 
instead of profit. The State agent can also maximize its gains by segmenting 
markets, i.e. divert some users by sending them to seek medical care in private 
health facilities. This is another form of discrimination (discrimination at the third 
degree) not considered in this study. Future researches could be guided towards 
this direction.  
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